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Abstract
Adversarial Training (AT) is proposed to alleviate the adversarial vulnerability
of machine learning models by extracting only robust features from the input,
which, however, inevitably leads to severe accuracy reduction as it discards the
non-robust yet useful features. This motivates us to preserve both robust and
non-robust features and separate them with disentangled representation learning.
Our proposed Adversarial Asymmetric Training (AAT) algorithm can reliably
disentangle robust and non-robust representations without additional supervision
on robustness. Empirical results show our method does not only successfully
preserve accuracy by combining two representations, but also achieve much better
disentanglement than previous work.
1 Introduction
A well-known obstacle of machine learning is the existence of adversarial examples. A small invisible
perturbation to the input can lead to dramatic misbehavior of neural networks [26], raising huge
concern about the vulnerability of machine learning. Various attack and defense algorithms have
been developed ever since, like a cat and mouse game [3].
Adversarial Training [6] is proposed to train a classifier with adversarial examples and effectively
makes it more robust to perturbations. Perhaps surprisingly, it is found that the robust features,
i.e., image features utilized by robust classifiers, are perceptually aligned with humans [22]. On
the contrary, the non-robust features from a standard classifier, are also useful for classification but
look like plain noise to humans. This indicates that adversarial training is founded on a human-
centric perspective [11], that it enforces neural networks to achieve the robustness defined by human
recognition, i.e., robustness against perturbations, which, however, may conflict with the nature of
neural networks. As a result, adversarial training of neural networks will inevitably lead to severe
accuracy reduction in the classification of natural images [27].
Nevertheless, robustness is desirable in some scenarios where humans are involved in the loop. In the
meantime, non-robust features also matter for accuracy, and it seems unwise to discard them as in
adversarial training. As Bengio et al. [1] put it, the most robust approach to feature learning is to
disentangle as many factors as possible, discarding as little information about the data as is practical.
Motivated by this, instead of keeping either of them, we propose to map robust and non-robust
features into two disentangled representations. Thus, both robust and non-robust features are not only
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preserved but also well separated. Afterwards, we can obtain a robust or non-robust classifier with
only one of the representations, or achieve better accuracy by combining two representations when
necessary.
Learning deep representations where different semantic aspects of data are structurally disentangled
is of central importance for training robust models [1, 25]. To achieve disentanglement, supervised
methods require access to additional supervision, in the form of pairwise data sharing the same
attributes [18], or the ground truth generative mechanism [15], etc. But those supervisions are
hardly available in practice. Alternatively, some focus on disentangling latent factors purely from
unsupervised data [10, 13], which, however, are challenged lately [16] as their disentanglement
scores are heavily influenced by randomness, and the disentanglement shows no clear benefit for
downstream tasks.
Our method has advantages over both diagrams. On the one hand, we can disentangle robust and
non-robust features without additional supervision on robustness. With class-labeled data, previous
work [23, 7] can only disentangle w.r.t. class itself, while ours can disentangle w.r.t. robustness, which
is not directly given by data. On the other hand, the unsupervised methods mostly rely on Variational
Autoencoders [14] with unstable performance [16], while our model is more efficient and effective as
it is deterministic, decoder-free, and able to produce successful disentanglement with little random
variability. Last but not least, our disentanglement shows clear benefits for downstream applications,
such as standard and adversarial predictions, as well as adversarial detection and calibration.
But how to achieve the disentanglement remains unclear. For a natural image, its robust and non-
robust features are entangled together, and we hardly know the ground truth of either of them. Ilyas
et al. [11] developed an iterative optimization scheme that constructs images with only robust or
non-robust features of a natural image, for which we call pseudo-inputs. Experiments show that they
can achieve a limited degree of disentanglement, but cause even worse accuracy reduction because
the generation of pseudo-inputs leads to a great loss of details in the raw images.
Our disentanglement method is based on the idea of pseudo-pairs instead. We notice that essentially
the process of adversarial attack is about modifying the non-robust features such that they belong
to a wrong class and lead to misclassification of the images. Therefore, a misclassified adversarial
example is supposed to contain robust and non-robust features about different classes, and the combi-
nation of a natural and an adversarial example yields a pseudo-pair for robustness disentanglement.
Based on this insight, we propose Adversarial Asymmetric Training (AAT) that assigns asymmetric
labels to robust and non-robust representations, and the asymmetry disentangles them apart. Vanilla
Adversarial Training extracts robust features alone and fails at preserving standard accuracy, while
our AAT extracts both kinds of features with disentanglement, and makes it possible to preserve
accuracy by combining two representations. Compared to the pseudo-input method [11], the disen-
tanglement with pseudo-pairs preserves the details of the images and achieves much better accuracy
and disentanglement. Besides, our method trains models end-to-end with much less computation.
2 Method
2.1 Notations and Preliminary
Standard training. Consider image classification with labeled training data Dtrain = {(x, y)},
where x ∈ RD is a D-dimensional input image, y ∈ {1, . . . , C} denotes its class label, and C is the
number of classes. We can train a classifier h with parameters θ by minimizing training loss as
min
θ
E(x,y)∼DtrainL(θ, x, y), L(θ, x, y) = l(h(x; θ), y), (1)
where l(·, ·) denotes the loss function, e.g. cross entropy, and h(x; θ) is the predicted probability
distribution over C classes. Assume the classifier has good standard accuracy after training.
Adversarial example. However, the standard classifier can be easily fooled by adversarial examples,
generated with small perturbation δ to the input image that maximizes the loss function [26],
xsadv = x+ argmax
δ∈S
L(θ, x+ δ, y), (2)
where S = {δ | ‖δ‖p ≤ ε} is the set of all feasible perturbations within `p norm constraint. We refer
to the classification accuracy under attack as robust accuracy.
2
Standard way Robust way Non-robust way
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Figure 1: Left: a diagram of our proposed three-way model. We encode an input image x into
the robust and non-robust representations zr and zn with two encoders gr and gn. Afterwards, we
use three ways to combine the two representations and predict the labels with a shared classifier f .
Right: an illustration of our proposed Adversarial Asymmetric Training with an image of a cat that is
misclassified as a dog after adversarial perturbation. We assign asymmetric supervisions to the two
representations to achieve robustness disentanglement.
Adversarial training. To alleviate adversarial attack, Adversarial Training (AT) [6] is proposed to
train a robust classifier by solving the following robust optimization problem [17]
min
θ
E(x,y)∼Dtrain
[
max
δ∈S
L(θ, x+ δ, y)
]
. (3)
Specifically, for a data sample (x, y), we first solve the inner loop and get the adversarial example
xadv , and then update parameters θ with adversarial pair (xadv, y) for the outer loop.
Robust and non-robust features. Define a feature as a function mapping from the input space X to
real numbers h : X → R. With a specified data distribution D and an adversarial configuration S,
we give formal definitions of robust and non-robust features for binary classification (C = 2).
• We call a feature h ρ-useful (ρ > 0) if it is correlated with the true label in expectation, i.e.,
E(x,y)∼D[y · h(x)] ≥ ρ.
• Suppose we have a ρ-useful feature h, we refer to h as a robust feature (formally a γ-
robustly useful feature) if h remains γ-useful (γ > 0) under adversarial perturbation, i.e.,
E(x,y)∼D [minδ∈S y · h(x+ δ)] ≥ γ.
• We refer to h as a non-robust feature (formally a γ-non-robustly useful feature) if it is
ρ-useful for some ρ > 0, but not γ-robust (γ > 0).
In other words, both robust and non-robust features are useful for classification, and they differ
merely in their behaviors under adversarial attack. As for their disentanglement, we should encourage
both of them to attain better usefulness (higher ρ), while encourage robust features to attain better
robustness (higher γ) and encourage non-robust features to attain better non-robustness (lower γ).
We also give formal definitions for robust and non-robust representations likewise in Appendix A.1
and a discussion of the accuracy-robustness dilemma in Appendix A.2.
2.2 Model
We start by proposing a discriminative model for disentanglement. Given an input image x, we
extract two representations through two encoders gr and gn with parameters θr and θn,
robust representation: zr = gr(x; θr); (4a)
non-robust representation: zn = gn(x; θn). (4b)
and they are supposed to extract robust and non-robust features of the image, respectively, and thus
disentangle them apart. Afterwards, the two representations are combined in three different ways and
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get predictions with a shared classifier f on the top,
standard way: hs(x; θ) = f([zr, zn]); (5a)
robust way: hr(x; θ) = f([zr,0]); (5b)
non-robust way: hn(x; θ) = f([0, zn]); (5c)
where we denote [·, ·] for vector concatenation, and 0 for a zero vector of equal size as zr and zn. See
Figure 1 (left) for illustration. In hr and hn, we set one of the representations to a constant vector to
make it non-informative. From a causal view [31], essentially we are performing interventions [21]
to eliminate the robust or non-robust features, i.e., do(zr) = 0 or do(zn) = 0.
2.3 Learning
In this part, we describe two training objectives for our model to achieve the disentanglement.
2.3.1 Standard Training
By definition both robust and non-robust features are useful for prediction, thus all three ways
should have high standard accuracy. Therefore, given a natural data pair (x, y), we assign a standard
classification loss to each of the three ways hs, hr, hn, and get the standard training loss as
LST (θ, x, y) = l(hs(x; θ), y) + l(hr(x; θ), y) + l(hn(x; θ), y). (6)
As a result, both representations are learned to be useful for prediction. Nevertheless, we can see
that the supervisions for robust and non-robust representations are totally symmetric in the standard
training loss. Therefore, the two representations cannot be disentangled at all.
2.3.2 Adversarial Asymmetric Training
To further achieve disentanglement, we need to break this symmetry, and the key is nothing but
adversarial examples. For a data pair (x, y), we can generate an adversarial example xsadv (Eq. 2)
w.r.t. the standard way loss l(hs(x; θ), y) to imitate attack to a standard classifier. We keep xsadv if it
is misclassified, i.e., its predicted class yˆs 6= y, and discard it otherwise. Because xsadv is very close
to x (visually indistinguishable), by definition, its robust features are still about label y. In contrast,
its non-robust features now belong to the misclassified class yˆs due to the adversarial attack.
In this way we obtain an image with robust and non-robust features about different classes. This
asymmetry enables us to disentangle the two representations with the following bi-level objective,
LAS(θ, x, y) = l(hr(xsadv; θ), y) + l(hn(xsadv; θ), yˆs),
s.t.
{
xsadv = x+ argmax
δ∈S
l(hs(x+ δ; θ), y),
yˆs = argmax hs(x
s
adv; θ), yˆs 6= y,
(7)
where we let the robust way predict the original label y from zr and let the non-robust way predict the
perturbed label yˆs from zn. Therefore, the two asymmetric labels provide different supervisions to
the two representations, such that zr stays invariant under attack (robust), and zn becomes sensitive
to perturbations (non-robust). Therefore the two representations are disentangled.
The total loss is the combination of standard loss and adversarial loss for a balance between accuracy
and disentanglement, and we re-organize it as
Ltotal(θ, x, y) = LST (θ, x, y) + LAS(θ, x, y)
= l(hs(x; θ), y) + l(hr(x; θ), y) + l(hr(x
s
adv; θ), y)
+ l(hn(x; θ), y) + l(hn(x
s
adv; θ), yˆs),
(8)
where (xsadv, yˆs) is generated according to Eq. 7. Overall, with the pseudo-pair (x, x
s
adv), we assign
different goals to the three ways to learn robust and non-robust representations,
• the standard way hs should take both kinds of features to achieve better standard accuracy;
• the robust way hr is encouraged to be invariant to perturbations as it is supposed to predict
label y whether there is an adversary or not;
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Algorithm 1 A training episode loss computation of Adversarial Asymmetric Training (AAT)
Input: natural data pair (x, y) ∈ Dtrain, current model parameters θ;
Output: training loss Ltotal(θ, x, y);
Predict x in three ways hs, hr, hn (Eq. 5);
Calculate standard loss LST (Eq. 6);
Generate an adversarial example xsadv w.r.t. the standard way loss (Eq. 2);
if xsadv is misclassified then
Predict xsadv in two ways hr, hn (Eq. 5);
Calculate adversarial loss LAS (Eq. 7);
return loss Ltotal = LST + LAS ;
else
return loss Ltotal = LST ;
end if
• the non-robust way hn is taught to be very sensitive to input perturbations, as it predicts x
to original class y and predicts xsadv , which is very close to x, to a different class yˆs.
To distinguish from Adversarial Training [6] that extracts robust features alone, we call our method
Adversarial Asymmetric Training (AAT), which instead preserves both robust and non-robust features
by disentanglement with asymmetric supervisions. See Figure 1 (right) for an example and Algorithm
1 for a complete description.
As we see, the pseudo-pairs are not given but a result of our training process. Remind that the prior
of robustness is human-centric. Thus robustness comes from nowhere but our design of training
objectives. In other words, the supervision of robustness is intrinsic rather than extrinsic. In our
work, adversarial examples are not only “not bugs” [11], and they instead become the key to the
disentanglement of robust and non-robust representations.
2.3.3 AAT++
To further encourage the disentanglement of the two representations, we design two auxiliary
asymmetric losses. In particular, to enhance the robustness of zr, we perform robust optimization
(Eq. 3) w.r.t. the robust way hr, which can be written equivalently as
LAR(θ, x, y) = l(hr(xradv; θ), y), s.t. xradv = x+ argmax
δ∈S
l(hr(x+ δ; θ), y). (9)
Similarly, to enhance the non-robustness of zn, we design the following objective for a non-robust-
way adversarial example xnadv misclassified as yˆn. As discussed above, the non-robust features of
xnadv belong to yˆn due to adversarial attack. Therefore, we encourage the non-robust way hn to detect
the non-robust features of xnadv with supervision yˆn:
LAN (θ, x, y) = l(hn(xnadv; θ), yˆn), s.t.
{
xnadv = x+ argmax
δ∈S
l(hn(x+ δ; θ), y),
yˆn = argmax hn(x
n
adv; θ), yˆn 6= y.
(10)
The two auxiliary asymmetric losses here are designed to further “purify” each representation to be
more robust or non-robust. Hence we coin the name AAT++ with total loss
L++total(θ, x, y) =LST (θ, x, y) + LAS(θ, x, y) + LAR(θ, x, y) + LAN (θ, x, y)
= l(hs(x; θ), y) + l(hr(x; θ), y) + l(hr(x
s
adv; θ), y) + l(hr(x
r
adv; θ), y)
+ l(hn(x; θ), y) + l(hn(x
s
adv; θ), yˆs) + l(hn(x
n
adv; θ), yˆn),
(11)
where (xsadv, yˆs), x
r
adv, (x
n
adv, yˆn) are generated according to Eq. 7, 9 & 10, respectively. As shown
in our ablation study in Sec. 3.3, the auxiliary terms can enhance the robustness disentanglement in
general, at the cost of sacrificing a little standard accuracy.
2.4 Adversarial Detection
Previous works have proposed various heuristics for detecting adversarial examples [29, 5, 19, 8, 2],
yet typically without an understanding of the existence of adversarial examples. Our disentanglement
of robust and non-robust features offers a principled approach for adversarial detection.
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Table 1: WideResNet34 backbone results on CIFAR-10 (accuracy in percentage).
Model Method Standard Adversarial (`∞) Adversarial (`2)S(↑) R(↑) N(↑) R(↑) N(↓) DIA (↑) R(↑) N(↓) DIA (↑)
1-way
ST (baseline) - - 95.1 - 0.0 - - 33.8 -
AT [17] - 90.0 - 39.9 - - 84.0 - -
ST+AT - 90.0 95.1 39.9 0.0 39.9 84.0 33.8 50.2
3-way
PI [11] 86.8 79.9 81.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 39.3 2.3 37.0
AAT (ours) 95.2 91.1 94.7 21.7 0.0 21.7 81.7 25.0 56.7
AAT++ (ours) 94.1 88.7 93.7 39.9 0.0 39.9 82.5 5.3 77.2
As discussed previously, the fundamental characteristic of (misclassified) adversarial examples is the
disagreement between robust and non-robust features. Therefore, we can detect adversarial examples
based on the two disentangled representations. Intuitively, if zr and zn agree, it is a natural image,
otherwise it is adversarial. Here we give a simplest rule D(x) to illustrate this idea,
yr = argmaxhr(x; θ), yn = argmaxhn(x; θ); D(x) =
{
0 (natural), if yr = yn;
1 (adversarial), if yr 6= yn, (12)
that is, directly comparing the predictions from the two representations. This rule can be directly
applied with our three-way model without extra computation. More complex strategies can also
be considered to exploit more information from the disentangled representations, e.g. training an
additional binary classifier [19] based on zr and zn. We leave this for future work.
2.5 Evaluation Metric
Based on our model, we propose two evaluation metrics for robustness disentanglement. Similarly,
the evaluation also does not require additional supervision on robustness.
Difference in Accuracy (DIA). For adversarial examples, the robust features are about the original
label, while the non-robust features likely belong to a different class. This will lead to the high
accuracy of the robust way and low accuracy of the non-robust way. In turn, a larger accuracy gap,
namely Difference in Accuracy, indicates better disentanglement of the two representations.
Rate of Adversarial Detection (RAD). We devise a rule for adversarial detection in Sec. 2.4 by
comparing inferred labels from robust and non-robust representations. Better disentanglement will
yield a better detection rate, and in turn, a better detection rate also indicates better disentanglement.
3 Experiments
3.1 Setup
We conduct experiments on two well-known image classification tasks, MNIST and CIFAR-10. More
experimental details can be found in Appendix B.
Model. We build our three-way model based on canonical CNNs for image classification. Specifically,
we remove the output layer and take the remaining modules as an encoder. We use two such encoders
as gr and gn, and use a multi-layer perceptron on top as f . For CIFAR-10, we consider two backbones,
WideResNet34 [30] and PreAct-ResNet18 [9]. For MNIST, we adapt from a small CNN [32]. The
hyper-parameters are inherited from conventions [32] without any additional tuning.
Evaluation. In the test stage, we evaluate natural images via all three ways, denoted as S (standard),
R (robust), N (non-robust). For white-box adversarial attack (see Table 4a for details), we evaluate
the robust way with adversarial examples generated w.r.t. the robust-way loss, and likewise for the
non-robust way. For completeness, we also include results for adversarial attack via the standard way,
and our methods produce more promising results in this scenario. See Appendix C.
We also implement previous methods within our three-way model for a fair comparison. Note our
implementations achieve comparable performance to the original work [27, 32].
• One-way ST & AT. Because the robust and non-robust ways utilize only one encoder and
one representation, they are almost identical to a normal CNN classifier. Thus we use a
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Table 2: PreAct-ResNet18 backbone results on CIFAR-10 (accuracy in percentage).
Model Method Standard Adversarial (`∞) Adversarial (`2)S(↑) R(↑) N(↑) R(↑) N(↓) DIA (↑) R(↑) N(↓) DIA (↑)
1-way
ST (baseline) - - 94.2 - 0.0 - - 35.1 -
AT [17] - 89.0 - 35.7 - - 81.5 - -
ST+AT - 89.0 94.2 35.7 0.0 35.7 81.5 35.1 46.4
3-way
PI [11] 86.8 79.9 81.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 41.4 0.8 40.6
AAT (ours) 94.8 91.8 93.8 10.8 0.0 10.8 79.9 22.1 57.8
AAT++ (ours) 94.2 88.2 93.7 33.5 0.0 33.5 81.0 28.2 52.8
Table 3: MNIST classification results (accuracy in percentage).
Model Method Standard Adversarial (`2)S(↑) R(↑) N(↑) R(↑) N(↓) DIA (↑)
1-way
ST (baseline) - - 99.5 - 17.9 -
AT [17] - 99.5 - 90.1 - -
ST+AT - 99.5 99.5 90.1 17.9 72.2
3-way AAT (ours) 99.6 99.6 99.5 82.9 4.6 78.3AAT++ (ours) 99.6 99.5 99.4 89.9 0.0 89.9
single way of our model to implement traditional methods: Standard Training (ST) with the
non-robust way hn, and Adversarial Training (AT) [17] with the robust way hr.2
• ST+AT. In fact, the simplest solution to extract robust and non-robust representations would
be to combine a standard and robust classifier, though they may not be properly aligned.
We can easily evaluate this method by combining the results of two separate models with
one-way ST and AT as above.
• PI (Pseudo-Input) [11]. The authors offer robust and non-robust versions of CIFAR-10
as pseudo inputs.3 We use them to learn disentangled representations in our three-way
model. We train the robust way with the robust dataset and train the non-robust way with
the non-robust datasets.
3.2 Classification Results
The quantitative results are illustrated in Table 1, 2 & 3. We mainly take WideResNet34 and `2 attack
in Table 1 for discussion and the rest are similar.
Standard accuracy. Comparing the standard accuracy of one-way ST and AT, we can see that
adversarial training leads to a severe accuracy reduction (∼5%) as it discards non-robust features.
Instead, in our three-way model with AAT, the standard way effectively improves standard accuracy
and is even competitive with standard training. AAT++ leads to a slight accuracy drop, but only by
one percent. It shows our method successfully preserves standard accuracy by combining robust and
non-robust features. However, another disentanglement approach, the pseudo-input method [11],
leads to even worse standard accuracy (86.8%), indicating its iterative optimization over the input
causes severe loss of details in the raw image.
Adversarial accuracy and disentanglement. The pseudo-input method indeed achieves some de-
gree of disentanglement, which is, however, very limited (37.0% DIA), and diminishes quickly under
stronger attack (`∞). In comparison, our pseudo-pair methods achieve much better disentanglement
with better robust accuracy, 56.7% DIA of AAT and 77.2% DIA of AAT++. As for one-way methods,
AT has the best robust accuracy (84.0%), yet the robust way of our AAT++ nearly matches this limit
(82.5%) and is also competitive under stronger attack. Meanwhile, the non-robust way of AAT++
achieves much lower accuracy than one-way ST (5.3% v.s. 33.8%), indicating better non-robustness.
Consequently, the disentanglement of our three-way model is better than the combination of two
one-way models (77.2% v.s. 50.2% DIA). The advantage is more evident when the attack is relatively
weak.
2We compare with half-half Adversarial Training [27] for a balance between standard and robust accuracy.
3https://github.com/MadryLab/constructed-datasets
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Table 4: (a) Configurations for adversarial attack, with range ε, `2 or `∞ norm, step size α, and
k steps of PGD [17]. (b) Adversarial detection and calibration results (accuracy in percentage).
The model is evaluated on a equal mixture of natural and (standard-way) adversarial examples of
CIFAR-10. RAD: rate of adversarial detection. Raw/Calibrated: classification accuracy before/after
the calibration.
(a) Adversarial configurations.
Data Mode Norm ε α k
CIFAR-10
Train `∞ 8/255 2/255 10
Test `∞ 8/255 2/255 20
`2 0.3 0.1 20
MNIST Train `2 0.3 0.01 5Test `2 0.3 0.01 10
(b) Adversarial Detection.
Method RAD Raw Calibrated
PI [11] 4.9 4.6 15.2
AAT 64.8 61.8 65.5
AAT++ 68.8 67.1 69.1
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(a) Representation Inversion.
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(b) Ablation study.
Figure 2: (a) Visualization of robust and non-robust representations learned by AAT++. (b) Ablation
study of the four losses of AAT++ (Eq. 11), with WideResNet34 backbone and `2 attack on CIFAR-10.
STD: standard. ADV: adversarial.
3.3 Further Analysis
Ablation study. We conduct ablation study for the four losses of AAT++ (Eq. 11), as shown in
Figure 2b. LST achieves good standard accuracy but yields no disentanglement. The introduction
of LAS effectively achieves the disentanglement of two representations. Furthermore, adding LAR
improves the robust accuracy, and adding LAN brings down the non-robust accuracy significantly.
Combining four terms as in AAT++, we have the best disentanglement with the highest DIA score,
while the standard accuracy drops a little in the meantime.
Adversarial detection and calibration. We evaluate our naïve detection rule (Eq. 12) and results
are shown in Table 4b. The pseudo-input method performs much worse than random guess (4.9%
RAD) because its robust accuracy is too poor. This also suggests its disentanglement is very limited.
AAT and AAT++ instead enjoy considerably better detection rates. More complex strategies can be
utilized for further improvement. As an additional application, we can also use the detection rule to
calibrate our prediction for the mixture of natural and adversarial images. Specifically, we apply the
robust way for inferred adversarial images and apply the standard way otherwise. From Table 4b, we
can see that the calibration helps improve classification accuracy in total.
Visualization. To intuitively understand the disentanglement, we invert the two representations to
input-level following [4]. From Figure 2a, we can see that the inversion of the robust representation is
human-conceivable, while that of non-robust representation seems just plain noise. This is consistent
with the phenomenon in previous work [4] that robust features are perceptually aligned with humans,
while non-robust features are not. More qualitative results are included in Appendix D.
4 Related Work
Adversarial examples are proposed as a threat to machine learning models [26]. Afterwards, Adver-
sarial Training [6] is developed to enhance robustness by feeding adversarial examples while training.
Although effective, AT is found to be the cause of severe accuracy reduction, and the trade-off
8
between accuracy and robustness is fundamentally inevitable [27, 33]. Nevertheless, adversarial
examples are not thus put to death and become useless. Recently, it is shown that it is possible to
improve standard accuracy with adversarial examples [28]. Our work also contributes to this thread
as we find adversarial examples can also serve as the fuel for disentangled representation learning.
Nevertheless, our method is not the only approach to utilize adversarial methods for disentanglement.
AdvMix [7] instead disentangles “relevant” and “irrelevant” features w.r.t. class with a minimax
game, while our work focuses on robustness disentanglement. However, AdvMix relies crucially on
a pre-trained StyleGAN [12], while our method trains from scratch and is decoder-free.
In semi-supervised learning scenarios, previous works utilize virtual labels, i.e., the current inferred
labels, to conduct adversarial training for unsupervised data [20, 24, 33]. In this work, we instead use
virtual labels, yˆs and yˆn, as supervisions for the non-robust features of adversarial examples. The
virtual labels are found to work well as long as the current model is relatively precise.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a novel Adversarial Asymmetric Training scheme for disentangling
robust and non-robust representations without additional supervision on robustness. Our method is
decoder-free, end-to-end, and achieves much better disentanglement compared to previous methods.
Future work may include more efficient architecture designs, applications to other computer vision
tasks, as well as advanced adversarial detection methods based on the disentangled representations.
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A Additional Theoretical Discussions
A.1 Definitions of Robust and Non-Robust Representations
Similar to the definitions of robust and non-robust features delivered in Sec. 2.1, here we present our
definitions for robust and non-robust representations accordingly.
Define a representation r as a function mapping from the input space X to a latent Space Z of lower
dimension, r : X → Z . We further define a classifier f as a function mapping from the latent SpaceZ
to real numbers, f : Z → R. With a specified data distribution D and an adversarial configuration S ,
we give formal definitions of robust and non-robust representations for binary classification (C = 2).
• We call a representation r ρ-useful (ρ > 0) if there exists a classifier f , such that h = f ◦ r
is correlated with the true label in expectation, i.e., E(x,y)∼D[y · h(x)] ≥ ρ.
• Suppose we have a ρ-useful representation r, we refer to r as a robust representa-
tion (formally a γ-robustly useful representation) if, there exists a classifier f , such
that h = f ◦ r remains γ-useful (γ > 0) under adversarial perturbation, i.e.,
E(x,y)∼D [minδ∈S y · h(x+ δ)] ≥ γ.
• We refer to r as a non-robust representation (formally a γ-non-robustly useful representation)
if it is ρ-useful for some ρ > 0, but not γ-robust (γ > 0).
A.2 The Accuracy-Robustness Dilemma
As discussed in the main text, there is a fundamental trade-off between accuracy and robustness
that enhancing robustness will inevitably lead to the degradation of standard accuracy. Besides the
empirical evidence given in previous work [27], it is shown that the accuracy-robustness dilemma
exits even if we have infinite data and optimal classifiers. Here, we present such an example to
illustrate the phenomenon. Our example is a variation of the one presented in [27], which we review
as follows.
The binary classification problem in [27]. The data model consists of input-label pairs (x, y)
sampled from a distribution D as follows:
y
u.a·r
∼ {−1,+1}, x1 =
{
+y, w.p. p
−y, w.p. 1− p′ x2, . . . , xd+1
i.i.d∼ N (ηy, 1) (13)
For this problem, a natural classifier
favg(x) := sign
(
w>unif x
)
, where wunif :=
[
0,
1
d
, . . . ,
1
d
]
(14)
achieves standard accuracy arbitrarily close to 100%, for d large enough. However, an `∞-bounded
adversary with ε = 2η, can shift the weakly-correlated features {x2, . . . , xd+1} towards −y. As
a result, the simple classifier that relies solely on these non-robust features cannot get adversarial
accuracy better than 1%.
On the contrary, assume p > 0.5, the classifier relying solely on robust features
frob(x) = sign
(
w>robx
)
, where wrob := [1, 0, . . . , 0] (15)
will have p accuracy in expectation under both standard and adversarial scenarios. frob attains
better robustness, at the cost of sacrificing accuracy (p < 1). Such a trade-off between accuracy
and robustness is fundamental and will not disappear even with infinite samples and Bayes-optimal
classifiers.
Limitations. The example above gives a clear illustration of the dilemma. However, the problem
setup is somewhat misleading because it suggests that a classifier relying solely on non-robust features
can achieve optimal accuracy. In fact, as shown in our experiments, such a classifier usually has
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sub-optimal standard accuracy, similar to the robust classifier. Only the standard way that combines
robust and non-robust features can achieve comparable performance to the one-way ST model. Here,
we give a variation of their example that shows not only the accuracy-robustness dilemma but also
the benefit of preserving both robust and non-robust features.
Our example. We consider the case where input pair (x, y) follows distribution
y
u,a,r∼ {−1,+1}, xi =
{
+ηiy, w.p. p
−ηiy, w.p. 1− p , i ∈ [d]. (16)
For simplicity we assume p = 0.8, d = 7, and
η1 = η2 = η3 = η4 = 0.01, η5 = η6 = η7 = 1.
Proposition 1. For the problem above, we have the following conclusions:
1) The following linear classifier
h0(x) := sign
(
w>0 x
)
, w0 =
[
1
η1
,
1
η2
, . . . ,
1
η7
]>
. (17)
has 94.4% standard accuracy in expectation and it is Bayes-optimal. Nevertheless, it always
has 0% accuracy under `∞ attack with ε = 0.02, because the adversary can shift the
non-robust features [x1, x2, x3, x4], towards −y.
2) Instead, the classifier
h1(x) := sign
(
w>1 x
)
, w1 =
[
0, 0, 0, 0,
1
η5
,
1
η6
,
1
η7
]>
. (18)
is optimal under attack, because it relies solely on the last three robust features [x5, x6, x7].
h1 attains 88.0% accuracy in expectation for both standard and adversarial scenarios.
Discussion. In our problem setup, neither robust nor non-robust features are perfect. Each of them
can be misleading for the correct label with a certain probability, and their combination can average
out the risks and yield optimal standard accuracy, which is more consistent with our experimental
results discussed in Sec. 3. It also suggests that standard training that aims at best accuracy is not
enough to extract solely non-robust features. Instead, besides the usefulness pursued by standard
training, our AAT and AAT++ further enhance the non-robustness of our non-robust way by enforcing
it to be sensitive to adversarial perturbations.
Proof. 1) For simplicity, we denote xˆi = xi/ηi for re-weighted features. Then the linear classifier
h0(x) = sign
(
7∑
i=1
xˆi
)
, xˆi ∈ {±1},
is equivalent to a majority voting method, and its classification is wrong only when there are at least
four xi’s indicating −y. Hence the expected standard accuracy of h0 follows
P (h0(x) = y) = 1− C47 (1− p)4 = 1− 35× 0.0016 = 0.944. (19)
Next, we prove its optimality. According to the problem setup, we have
P (Y = y|X = x) =P (X = x|Y = y)P (Y = y)
P (X = x)
=
∏
i
p(xˆiy+1)/2(1− p)(1−xˆiy)/2∑
y p
(xˆiy+1)/2(1− p)(1−xˆiy)/2 .
(20)
And the decision rule of the Bayes-optimal classifier should be
h∗(x) =
{
+1, if P (Y = y|X = x) ≥ 12 ;
−1, otherwise. (21)
Notice that if there are 4 xˆi’s different from y, we have
P (Y = y|X = x) = p
3(1− p)4
p3(1− p)4 + p4(1− p)3 ≈ 0.2 < 0.5, (22)
12
and the probability is smaller with more such features. So the Bayes-optimal classifier is right when
they are at most 3 xˆi’s different from y. Following Eq. 19, we can conclude that the expected standard
accuracy of the Bayes-optimal classifier could be no more than 0.944. Because h0 achieves this
expected accuracy, it is optimal.
2) Because the specified adversary can change the sign of non-robust features arbitrarily, the first four
features [x1, x2, x3, x4] becomes non-informative. Hence we can only rely on the robust features
[x5, x6, x7]. Following the same deduction in Eq. 19, h1’s expected robust accuracy is
P (h1(x) = y) = 1− C23 (1− p)2 = 1− 3× 0.04 = 0.88. (23)
In fact, it is optimal under adversarial attack. It is easy to tell that h1’s expected standard accuracy
of is also 88%. Compared to h0, it becomes much more robust, but at the cost of sacrificing 6.4%
standard accuracy. h0 can achieve the best standard accuracy because it preserves both robust and
non-robust features in the input. It shows that the trade-off between accuracy and robustness occurs
even with infinite data and Bayes-optimal classifiers.
B Additional Experimental Setup
B.1 Model
In our three-way model, the two encoders, gr and gn, are beheaded classification models with the
same architecture. Hence they provide two representations of the same size H . As for the shared
classifier on top, the first linear layer has a size of 2H × H , followed by a ReLU activation and
another linear layer of the size H × C, where C is the number of classes.
B.2 Training
We list our training configurations in Table 5. All these hyper-parameters are di-
rectly immigrated from the YOPO repository, see https://github.com/a1600012888/
YOPO-You-Only-Propagate-Once. We implement our methods with PyTorch and conduct experi-
ments on NVIDIA P100 GPUs.
Table 5: Training Configurations in our experiments.
Task Backbone Learning Rate Momentum Weight Decay Epoch Milestones
CIFAR-10 Wide34 0.1 0.9 2e-4 105 [75, 90,100]Res18 0.05 0.9 5e-4 105 [75, 90,100]
MNIST CNN 0.1 0.9 5e-4 56 [50,55]
C Additional Quantitative Results
In Sec. 3, we show adversarial accuracies obtained under attack w.r.t. the robust and non-robust
way loss, respectively. In this part, we include additional results when the attack is crafted w.r.t. the
standard way of our model, which resembles the attack to a standard classifier.
From Table 6, 7, 8, we can see AAT can yield even better robust accuracy than one-way AT under
standard-way attack, and AAT++ can generally achieve better robustness. The disentanglement score
is also better than the pseudo-input method.
Nevertheless, we notice that our non-robust accuracy is not as good as the pseudo-input method.
Meanwhile, its non-robust-way standard accuracy is much lower than ours, due to the loss of details
in the raw image. It indicates that the combination of the pseudo-input and pseudo-pair methods
might produce better disentanglement without loss of accuracy. We leave this for future work.
D Additional Qualitative Results
Here, in Figure 3 & 4, we give more qualitative results to show the difference between two disentan-
gled representations, including the gradient visualization task [27] and the representation inversion
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Table 6: CIFAR-10 results (accuracy in percentage) with WideResNet34 backbone with attack w.r.t.
the standard way.
Model Training Adversarial (`∞) Adversarial (`2)S(-) R(↑) N(↓) DIA (↑) S(-) R(↑) N(↓) DIA (↑)
1-way ST - - 0.0 - - - 33.8 -AT [17] - 39.9 - - - 84.0 - -
3-way
PI [11] 0.0 5.2 0.0 5.2 22.5 64.8 4.9 59.9
AAT (ours) 0.0 59.5 0.0 59.5 69.0 89.8 35.2 54.6
AAT++ (ours) 9.8 66.4 0.0 66.4 77.9 89.0 23.7 65.3
Table 7: CIFAR-10 results (accuracy in percentage) with Pre-activated ResNet18 backbone with
attack w.r.t. the standard way.
Model Training Adversarial (`∞) Adversarial (`2)S(-) R(↑) N(↓) DIA (↑) S(-) R(↑) N(↓) DIA (↑)
1-way ST - - 0.0 - - - 35.1 -AT [17] - 35.7 - - - 81.5 - -
3-way
PI [11] 0.0 8.2 0.0 8.2 21.6 65.7 1.3 64.4
AAT (ours) 0.2 38.9 0.0 38.9 66.6 88.1 31.4 56.7
AAT++ (ours) 1.3 63.8 0.0 63.8 68.4 86.5 35.3 51.2
task [4]. They both show that the robust representations are perceptually aligned with humans while
the non-robust representations seem plain noise. Details of implementation are as follows.
D.1 Gradient Visualization
We show the gradient for a clean image w.r.t. the robust and non-robust way loss as in [27]. For
each image pair (x, y) and the specified classifier h, we calculate the gradient w.r.t. the input
∇x l(h(x; θ), y). We clip gradients to ±3 standard deviations of their mean and rescale them to the
range [0, 1].
D.2 Representation Inversion
Following [4], we inverse each representation to input and see what we can get. We initialize the input
from random noise and optimize it by minimizing the distance between its robust (or non-robust)
representation and the target representation, similar to the construction of robust and non-robust
datasets in [11]. We use a learning rate of 1.0 with 10000 steps for CIFAR-10.
Figure 3: Gradient visualization with WideResNet34 backbone on CIFAR-10.
14
Table 8: MNIST results (accuracy in percentage) with attack w.r.t. the standard way.
Model Training Adversarial (`2)S(-) R(↑) N(↓) DIA (↑)
1-way ST - - 17.4 -AT [17] - 89.8 - -
3-way AAT (ours) 51.0 93.9 30.4 63.5AAT++ (ours) 12.6 97.8 7.3 90.5
Figure 4: Representation inversion with WideResNet34 backbone on CIFAR-10.
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